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I. INTRODUCTION
Conflict, Terrorism and the Media in Asia' is the fourth and latest
release in a series of publications by a group of diverse scholars focused on2
studying the impact of media and changes in societal culture in Asia.
Previous books in the series have dealt with analyzing the television
industry, 3 journalism and democracy, 4 and film and copyright 5 issues
across Asia. This fourth book provides a study of the subnational conflicts
across Asia and how they fit into the global "War on Terror." The authors
do this by examining the condition of free press, access to media, and
* Rebekah L. Bina currently practices law as an associate attorney in the Corporate
Telecommunications group of Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, Pordy & Ecker in Rockville,
Maryland. She earned her Master's Degree in Media Management and her J.D. with a
certificate in National Security Law from Syracuse University.
1. CONFLICT, TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA IN ASIA (Benjamin Cole ed.,
RoutledgeCurzon 2006) [hereinafter Cole].
2. Routledge Media, Culture and Social Change in Asia has an editorial board
comprised of university scholars from Australia, England, India, and the United States.
3. TELEVISION

ACROSS

ASIA,

TV

INDUSTRIES,

PROGRAMME

FORMATS

AND

GLOBALISATION (Albert Moran & Michael Keane eds., RoutledgeCurzon 2003).
4. JOURNALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN ASIA (Angela Romano & Michael Bromley eds.,
RoutledgeCurzon 2005).
5. LAIKWAN PANG, CULTURAL CONTROL AND GLOBALIZATION IN ASIA (2005).
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diversity in news reporting. They explore how media can be a tool in
facilitating ideological coalition, but also how access to and power over the
media are used in an attempt to shelter populations and maintain political
stability.
The book begins with an introductory commentary on journalism in
the United States. The remaining chapters deal with the role of media in the
current political struggles, conflict, and terrorist activities in five Asian
regions: Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, India, and China. Each chapter is
written by an author familiar with that region's media outlets and political
environment, pre- and post-September 11, 2001.
The book provides significant background, factual information, and
analysis of each region's conflicts. However, the chapter materials also
draw heavily on the personal opinions, experiences, education, and studies
of each author. The chapters are revealing but brief, and only provide a
glimpse into the complex issues these regions and this part of the world
face. Terrorism is by no means a new concept, yet its definition remains
vague and inexact as regions of the world encounter different types of
terrorism and deal with it in their own way. This book attempts to illustrate
that this is true even when the terrorist activities are based in similar or
shared ideology.
It is important to note that while it would be a monumental task to
incorporate all facts and history of the complex conflicts facing this region,
some chapters provide a more objective perspective than others. By design,
this book is meant to question the tactics and politics of the regions, but at
times the reader is left wondering whether counterpoints were missed or
otherwise avoided. Certainly an interesting and valuable reference, this
book is better considered summary commentary rather than a thorough
impartial analysis. The remainder of this Review will provide a brief
summary of the conflicts, types of terrorism, and media involvement this
book reveals.

II. UNITED STATES

6

Probably the least objective of all the chapters, this chapter analyzes
the methods and influence of the United States media. Specifically, the
author deals with the journalistic style of network and cable television news

reporting of the "War on Terrorism," pointing out its failures and the effect
on both American and foreign perceptions of U.S. government policy. He
stresses the importance of the American media's responsibility to operate
6. This chapter is written by Toby Miller, a professor of English, Sociology, and
Women's studies at the University of California Riverside and a published author on culture
and media. See University of California Faculty Directory (2006), available at http://www.
facultydirectory.ucr.edu.
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as a democratic "checking" function on the government, but he argues
media consolidation, the influence of Republican-backed think tanks in
Washington, and the financial support of high-profile Republicans forced
nationalistic reporting that gave media consumers an unrealistic sense of
both the cultural and military situation in the events following September
11, 2001.7 By now this is not a wholly unique argument. However, the
author points to several incidents following the invasion of Afghanistan as
8
evidence of his claims, including: MSNBC's firing of Phil Donahue,
Condoleezza Rice's request for news organizations to cease airing tapes of
Osama bin Laden containing coded messages, 9 the Pentagon's purchase of
the rights to satellite photos of Afghanistan,' 0 Rupert Murdoch's pledge of
12
patriotism, 11 embedded reporters self-censorship of images from Iraq,'
3
and the holding of Guantanamo prisoners without access to legal counsel.'
The author claims that "truth" in news14 reporting can only be found in
public radio and television broadcasting.
Additionally, the author blames the media itself for mediocre
reporting of foreign events. He points to the closing of international branch
offices of American news organizations over the last several years,
indicating this led to a decline in international news reporting. More
importantly, he argues, this has created a focus on sensationalistic reporting
and a lesser acknowledgment understanding, and appreciation of world
cultures and political events. 5 The author points out that, as a result,
releases from the State Department, White House, and Pentagon ("Golden
Triangle") are sometimes the only authorities considered. 16 Moreover, he
argues that a lack of understanding leaves a reporter in foreign territory
relying solely on what has been made available by the country. An
insightful quoted passage from an Egyptian reporter displays the frustration
foreigners have with American media when reporters visit a country. The
Egyptian reporter describes what he terms "the American Express Tour,"
whereby all American reporters visit and interview the same people at the
same places in a short period of time before returning as "experts on the
Middle East." 17 The author also includes another passage taken from a
7. Cole, supra note 1, at 5-15.
8. Id.at 19.

9. Id.at 10.
10. Id.at 11.
11.

Id. at 10.

12. Id.at 11-13.
13. Cole, supra note 1, at 11-13.
14. Id.at 21.

15. Id.at 15-21.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id.at 16.
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Pakistani article, which pokes fun at American CNN correspondents but
reveals that American news organizations appear to lack legitimacy in
foreign countries because of a clear knowledge gap.18
While the author of this chapter makes valid points about the
limitations of U.S. journalism and provides interesting supporting facts and
data, in the end his efforts are somewhat undermined by the expressive
belittling language and lack of impartial analysis. This highly critical and
cynical chapter leaves the reader asking whether American journalism has
any redeeming qualities. However, there is certainly no arguing the
author's clear leftist-leaning personal views on current events.

III. MALAYSIA

9

The author of this chapter describes Malaysia as a technologically
advanced country with an advanced media network and a strict, powerful
government. 20 He points out that although Malaysia does not currently
encounter terrorism on a large scale, its geographical location makes the
country a key to militant operations in the Southeast Asian region,
necessitating the country's political involvement in regional conflict. The
author considers the primary terrorist coalition in Malaysia to be the
Kumpulan Militan Malaysia ("KMM"). This group maintains connections
with al Qaeda and shares membership and the ideology of creating a
regional pan-Islamic state with the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah
("JI"). 2 2 These two organizations remain on the U.S. list of foreign terrorist
organizations, although the Malaysian government categorizes the KMM as
an "extremist" group.
The author explains how the existence of these groups and the
potential volatility of being geographically located among several other
countries with rooted militant activity cause the Malaysian government to
assert strong influence over the operation of the media networks. He notes
that the government often takes advantage of their high esteem and access
to the media to perpetuate state views and control reports critical of the

18. Id. at 16.
19. This chapter was written by Benjamin Cole, co-author of The New Face of
Terrorism. He also obtained a Ph.D. in International Relations from Southampton
University.
20. Cole, supra note 1, at 23-24.
21. Id. at 23. Malaysia is essentially the geographic center between Thailand,
Cambodia, Vietnam, and China to the North, the Philippines to the East, and Indonesia to
the South and West.
22. See Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder-Jemaah Islamiyah, http://www.
cfr.org/publication/8948/jemaahislamiyah.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
23. Cole, supra note 1, at 23, 25. The author indicates that terrorism in Malaysia is
defined as "killing of innocent civilians" with mitigating circumstances.
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government's four main policies. 24 These policies emphasize challenging
the objectives of militants, 25 government protection of Muslim rights
26
against militant groups •and•groups that ~27
fund them,
opposing
violence as
.
..
the means to solving Islamic problems, and maintaining unity within the
Muslim world and Malaysia. 8 The administration uses the media to report
government success in preserving national security and to disseminate its
counterterrorism policies. 29 As a gatekeeper of news reporting, the
government requires media
outlets to obtain permits and regularly censors
30
programming material.
The Malaysian population is familiar with the KMM, although the
31
group does not actively publicize or attempt to access Malaysian media.
Therefore, the author points out that reports of domestic KMM activities,
ideologies, and violence are infrequent, although the government does
allow reporting of member arrests and detentions. KMM and other militant
activities are considered a regional and national issue and not associated
with the global "War on Terror. ' 32 Alternatively, Malaysian media
diligently reports on the activities of terrorist organizations and groups
33
supporting a link between US foreign policy and oppression of Muslims.
As such, the media frequently reports on JI and al Qaeda activities,
including released messages from Osama bin Laden. 34 They also report on
activities of the nonviolent and less extreme Islamist political party, PAS,
which also supports
an "Islamic" state and the link between the U.S. and
35
Muslim violence.
As a result of the strong hand of government, the author explains that
Malaysians are not left with access to objective reporting or thoughtful
analysis of world politics. Regional illegal print publications do exist, but
circulation is obviously limited and these publications are dangerous to
36
maintain.
Likewise,
thegovernment
Internet has requires
providedservice
an alternative
news
sourcea
for Malaysians,
but the
providers
to hold

24. Id.at 24.
25. Id.at 35.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 36.
28. Id.
29. Cole, supra note 1, at 37.
30. Id. at 24.
31. Id. at 25-26.
32. Id.at 30.
33. Id. at 28. The bias is also anti-Western, including negative reporting regarding the
motives of Russia, Israel, and Australia. Id.
34. Cole, supra note 1, at 26-27.
35. Id.at 3.
36. Id.at 25.
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taken a more active role in censoring Islamic
license and has recently
37
sites.
Web
extremist
IV. INDONESIA

38

The author of this chapter focuses on the struggle that Indonesia faces
as it attempts to modernize a country that is geographically divided and
culturally and religiously diverse. 39 He states that Indonesia is the largest
Muslim nation and explains that due to its mix of faiths and varying levels
of sophistication, the status of individual rights and political stability have
ridden a rollercoaster ride over the years. Following its gain of
independence in 1945, the country adopted a modern constitution stressing
"pancasila" or the principles of one supreme God, humanitarianism,
nationalism and unity, democracy, and social justice. But under the
Suharto regime,
41 gave way to old habits of secrecy, military power, and
• •• it
cultural division. The author describes a "media boom" in 1999 whereby
Indonesia opened its doors to media, and foreign programming flooded
print, television, radio, film, and satellite with new images and ideas that
the Indonesian population could not resist. 42 This also created economic
opportunity, enticing Indonesian business elites to invest in the new and
emerging outlets and hope was held out for a free press. 43 However, not
elite nervous about foreign
surprisingly, press freedom makes the political
44
relations and criticism of the government.
Currently, the Indonesian government supports the renewed regional
political ideology committed to controlling domestic and regional militant
The overriding fear of security among the Southeast
organizations.
nations drives the desire to keep a close watch on the media and what is
released to the general public. Indonesia's specific concern is regional
separatist movements and religious Muslim-Christian conflicts. The
author shows that this renewed devotion to security issues has led to
37. Id. at 25-26.
38. This chapter is written by Jonathan Woodier, the Director of Regional and
Corporate Affairs for Citibank Asia Pacific.
39. Cole, supra note 1, at 47.
40. Id.
41. Id. at46-48.
42. Id. at 43-45.
43. Id. at 53.
44. Id. at 56. This includes criticism from foreign press as well as domestic press. Prior
to the 2004 election, Sydney Jones, an American researcher working for International Crisis
Group, was expelled from the country in a presumed effort to silence criticism. Id. at 57.
45. Cole, supra note 1, at 41-43. This also includes anti-U.S, sentiment associated with
U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
46. Id. at 44-45.
47. Id.
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increasing power for political elites. 4 8 Shortly after the "media boom," the
government quickly reverted to pressuring the media by pursuing libel
cases, revoking licenses, instituting media ownership rules against cross
49
ownership and foreign ownership, and establishing a censorship board.
Additionally, the military continues to take a role in monitoring safety,
which includes asserting power over the media. 50 The author explains that
this is troubling, because due to its decreasing legitimacy and lack of
sufficient funding, it has become a corrupt organization known to engage in
illegal and brutal activities.5 1 As a result, the media is not freely accessible
to all. Journalists are often restricted from accessing conflicted portions of
the country
and face dangerous pressure from both the military and the
52
rebels.
The author points out, however, that a glimmer of hope exists in the
widespread use and advancement of the Internet and satellite technology.
The Internet became accessible to the masses in the 1990s and went
unchecked by the government. 53 It played an important democratic role in
the 2004 election, exposing candidates and information and even providing
a certain amount of economic opportunity.5 54 Moreover, the political elite
still find it increasingly difficult to police.
V. PHILIPPINES

56

As with the other countries in this region, the author of this chapter
identifies the Philippines as a nation caught between several subnational
and regional conflicts due to its geographical location. The Communist
Party of the Philippines ("CPP"), New Peoples Army ("NPA"), Moro
57
Islamic Liberation Front ("MILF"), JI, and Abu Sayyaf Group ("ASG")
all maintain significant strongholds in the country and influence over the
media. 58 The author points out that while the U.S., EU, and some portions
of the Filipino media categorize these groups as terrorist organizations and
part of the "War on Terror," portions of the Filipino media simply label

48. Id. at 52.
49. Id. at 41-44.
50. Id. at49-51.
5 1. Cole, supra note 1, at 48-49.
52. Id. One such example is the effort of the government against the Free Aceh
Movement ("FAM") rebels in Aceh. Id.
53. Id. at 54.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 53-55.
56. The author of this chapter is Benjamin Cole.
57. The author notes this group is the most violent of the groups operating in the
Philippines and the most closely identified with al Qaeda. Cole, supranote 1, at 72-75.
58. Id. at61,65.
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them as guerillas, separatist organizations, or rebels. 59 The U.S. has
identified the Philippines as a central component in the "War on Terror"
and has fostered relationships with the Filipino government.
60 As a result,
U.S. views and policies are positively reported in the media.
The author explains that the CPP-NPA organization uses its ties to
61
exploit the government corruption and expose the group's ideologies.
They tend to operate in rural areas of the country and maintain a Web site
frequently updated with reports, ideologies, and propaganda. 62 According
to the author, this is done in an effort to reach urban Filipinos as well. The
MILF also operates a Web site for similar reasons, but it is more secular in
its appeal, avoiding Islamic terms and lacking reference to the group's
ideology. W3 Additionally, MILF uses the media to portray the group as
peaceful separatists and to encourage reports of its involvement in the
regional peace process. 64 The author points out that the JI arm in the
Philippines does not have nor does it seek direct access to the media. The
government legitimizes JI ideology by releasing reports of the group's
activities of its own accord. 65 Finally, the author explains how the ASG
operates a perplexing relationship with the media, sometimes seeking
media attention to intimidate the public and at other times kidnapping and
blackmailing journalists that try to report on ASG events.6 6 As a result,
ASG's effort to6 7influence the media and public opinion since 9/11 is not
taken seriously.
Despite the dangerous nature of the politics in the Philippines, the
author indicates Filipino media is still considered one of the most
progressive in this region as it takes an active role in rejecting and
challenging government attempts at censorship. 6 8 However, he notes that
the transition is ongoing and complicated. A drive for sensationalistic
programming, a desire to keep operation costs low, and a lack of
professional journalistic standards still results in misreporting and skewed
reporting of significant domestic events.69 Additionally, attempts to
provide alternative sources and balanced reports have resulted in backlash
from the Muslim community who argue that the media fails to define terms
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 65.
Id. at 78-79.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 64-67.
Cole, supra note 1, at 67-71.

64. Id.

65. Id. at 71-72.
66. Id. at 72-76.
67. Id. at 75.

68. Id. at 80-81.
69. Cole, supra note 1, at 63, 76.

Number 2]

CONFLICT,TERRORISM & THE MEDIA IN ASIA

and distinguish between "terrorism" and the Muslim community as a
whole. The author points out that "terrorist" activity in the Philippines
prior to 2004 included a broad range of activities, including guerilla
fighters, bandits kidnappers, arsonists, murderers, and other general
criminal activity. '

VI. INDIA

72

The author of this chapter focuses specifically on the influences of
Hindutva politics in the prosperous Gujarat region of India. 73 This area is
of particular interest, he argues, due to the long-standing political and
social conflicts between Hindus and Muslims. 74 The Hindutva political
players include organizations comprising the Sangh parivar whose
7 5 Some
collective goal is to revitalize Hindu social and religious
S 76 traditions.
of these organizations focus on political dominance, while others are
more focused on religious goals. The Hindutva has acquired a strong
78
political influence in Gujarat. The author focuses on coverage of a 2002
attack on members of the Sangh parivar to illustrate the role, influences,
and changes in Indian journalistic reporting.
The chapter points out that India's media is unique because of the
culturally dichotomous nature of the country. On the one hand, India is
politically and technologically advanced, exhibiting strong influences from
western economy, democracy, and culture. However, the majority of India
remains a developing country with strong religious and conservative
hierarchical systems and many very poor populations isolated from the
ideologies and advancements of western life.79 The mainstream media
reflects this makeup by supeorting two types of press: English-language
and non-English-language.
Understandably, this often results in the
expression of differing perspectives. Unfortunately, this diversity is not
necessarily accessible to the majority of the population because most do not

70. Id.at 62-63.
71. Id.
72. The author of this chapter is Prasun Sonwalkar, an Indian journalist and professor of
media studies at the University of the West of England.
73. The Gujarat region borders the Arabian Sea to the West and Pakistan to the North.
74. Cole, supra note 1, at 85.
75. Id. at 84.
76. For example, the Bharatiya Janata Party ("BJP") and Vishwa Hindu Parishad

("VHP"). Id.
77. For example, the Kar sevaks, a group working to build a temple to a Hindu god
symbolizing wrongs against Hindus. Id.at 85-86.
78. Id. at 85-87.
79. Id. at 82-84.
80. Cole, supra note 1, at 84.
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possess English-language skills. 8 1 Moreover, journalism can be a
dangerous profession in Gujarat. Critical reporting of government actions
and ideologies, certain groups, or individual participants can result in the
media outlet or the individual journalist being banned, losing accreditation,
financially strangled, provided restricted access, and in some cases
subjected to physical violence. 82 The author points out, however, that as a
very large democratic nation, there is hope that new media outlets, growing
encourage
media use, and increasing economic and social development will
83
the Indian media to pursue an independent watchdog function.

VII. XINJIANG

84

The author of this chapter makes a point to show that, although the
large northwestern region of Xinjiang is politically controlled by China, its
geographical proximity to countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan gives the people, language, culture, and
ideology of this region an identity much more akin to its Russian and
Middle Eastern neighbors than to its mother country. 8 5 The author explains
that the people of the Xinjiang region are essentially a mix of Uyghurs and
Han-Chinese. 86 Uyghurs are Muslims with Turkic traditions that speak
Uyghur, while Han-Chinese maintain cultural traditions stemming from
both Buddhism and Daoism and speak Chinese. 87 Conflict in this region
arises domestically between underprivileged separatist-minded Uyghurs on
the one hand, and the communist Han-Chinese government ("CCP") and
88
the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps ("XPCC") on the other.
Additionally, violence sometimes arises domestically between poor
Uyghurs and educated Uyghurs. The latter are viewed as untrustworthy
since mangy also speak Chinese and live or work in close proximity to HanChinese.

81. Id. at 82-84.
82. Id. at 88-96. The author points out that specifically identifying attackers and
victims by religious association was a practice not previously engaged in or supported as
part of the "journalistic code" in Gujarat. The 2002 attack seems to be the first time this was
done. Id. at 88-89.
83. Id. at 97.
84. The author of this chapter is Michael Dillon, an author and lecturer in Modem
Chinese History.
85. Cole, supranote 1, at 98-100.
86. Id. at 100. Han-Chinese were introduced to this region following China's
annexation of this region.
87. Id. at 98, 101. However, many Han-Chinese are not religious.
88. Id. at 100-02. XPCC is an arm of the People's Liberation Army ("PLA") devoted to
securing the border regions. Id.
89. Id.
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China also struggles internationally to control violence with its
northern and western neighbors. The country relaxed its migration policies
following the fall of communism in central Asia and the strained trade
relations that resulted. However, China did not change any of its policies
91
regarding economic development of the West or religious freedom.
Instead, the government quickly became nervous of an uprising in
separatist Islamic activity due to the cultural similarities between the
Uyghur people of the Xinjiang region and Uyghurs of the neighboring
regions. According to the author, the country acted quickly to flex its
persuasive muscle and amassed the Shanghai Co-operation Organization to
protect its borders against violence and the influx of any Islamic materials
that arguably support separatist ideologies or goals, including firearms and
any Islamic literature. 93 Domestically this also includes the regulation of
religious practices and places of worship, birth control, and exporting of
Xinjiang resources.9 4 Following 9/11, China designated Islamic separatists
as terrorists linking them to al Qaeda and declaring them part of the "War
on Terror." The author reviews several incidents attributed to separatist
terrorism, including riots, stealing weapons and cash, bomb explosions,
rallies and demonstrations, protests,
strikes, robbing and looting, and
96
surrounding government buildings.
As a communist country, the Chinese government obviously controls
all media outlets, and as such, there are no independent state, regional, or
local media. 97 As a result, the conflicts and separatist movements in
Xinjiang are not well covered, and access to the region is often restricted
from journalist entry. 98 The coverage of separatism that does exist in
newspapers and on television, the author says, is largely focused on
convictions of separatist criminal activities, arrests of members, and
warnings not to get involved. 99 Likewise, government materials are not
distributed outside of the country, so the foreign media does not have
1
access to these materials or reliable information upon which to report. 00
90. Cole, supra note 1, at 104.
91. Id. at 105-06.
92. The author points out that China has struggled to maintain power over various
Muslim separatist movements throughout history. As a result, the government considers
these movements the primary and highest national security threat. Id.at 102.
93. Id.at 104-05. This organization is comprised of leaders from China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Pakistan was not permitted to join. Id.
94. Id.at 105-06.
95. Cole, supra note 1, at 111.
96. Id.at 107-08.
97. Id.at 114-15.
98. Id.at 114.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Although the Internet helps this problem somewhat, it is not reliable.
Internet access is not widely available to individuals and remains strictly
monitored.' 0 ' According to the author, the best source of alternative
from illegal Uyghur
information about the Xinjiang conflict comes
102
region.
the
within
carefully
passed
publications

VIII. CONCLUSION
The authors of this book provide unique insight into the types of
terrorism and conflict afflicting Asia. It is made clear that Asian
governments operate similarly, but with varying degrees of success and
influence over the media. The authors make a strong point that regardless
of the nation, regional suspicion of cultural diversity and separatist
movements fuel the desire to keep a close watch on the media and any
journalistic attempt to criticize methods of maintaining national security.
The authors collectively argue that, for the most part, U.S. policy and the
"War on Terror" has not been successful in reducing conflict or terrorism
in Asia. In some cases, the authors seem to imply that it has sparked further
conflict, especially among Islamic communities. Further, although
somewhat more subtly, the authors suggest that U.S. policies since
September 11, 2001 have stalled democratic progress in Asia,
strengthening governmental power and justifying restrictions on individual
and press freedoms.

101. Cole, supranote 1, at 115.
102. Id.

